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A. J. Thomas, Jr.*
I. CHOICE OF LAW
Contracts-Usury. Securities Investment Co. v. Finance Acceptance Corp.,'
involved suit on a contract by a Missouri lender against a Texas borrower.
The borrower claimed that the interest under the contract was usurious. The
trial court entered judgment for the borrower against the lender for the
usurious interest. This judgment was based on the Texas law relating to
usurious interest." The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, indicat-
ing among other things that Missouri law governed the issue of usury. The
applicable Missouri statute denied corporations the protection of statutes limit-
ing interest rates.' Missouri law was said to control in the case because the
parties had explicitly chosen Missouri law in the agreement.' Thus, the court,
citing Teas v. Kimball,' relied on the Texas conflict of laws rule that "[wihere
the parties to a contract specify in the instrument that it is to be governed by
the law of a particular state that law will apply if it has a reasonable rela-
tionship to the contract."'
Permitting the parties to choose the law which is to govern their rights
and duties under the contract is a party autonomy rule and has been criticized
for allowing bootstrapping. In the words of Judge Learned Hand: "Some
law must impose the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatever to
do with that; no more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes. '
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, however, does include a
limited party autonomy rule. The parties are given free choice of law when
matters which they could have resolved by an express provision in their con-
tract are involved. Even with matters which the parties could not have re-
solved in the contract, such as the validity of the contract or the creation of
obligation thereunder, the parties are allowed to choose, unless the law of
the state which is chosen "has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice."'
The rule of Teas relied on in the principal case seems to set forth a similar
rule in stating that the parties can choose the applicable law of a particular
state providing that state has a reasonable relationship to the contract. Can
it be said then that a partial party autonomy rule applies in Texas to the
* B.S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M.,
S.J.D., University of Michigan. William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law,
Southern Methodist University.
1474 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.) 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
2TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (1971).
3 Mo. REV. STAT. S 408.060 (1952).
1 The agreement stated: "All rights and liabilities of the parties shall be governed as
to validity, interpretation, enforcement and effect by the laws of the state of Missouri." 474
S.W.2d at 271.
257 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1958).
6474 S.W.2d at 271.
'E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931). See also J. BEALE,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1079-86 (1935).
'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
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creation of obligation or validity of a contract? Such a conclusion would be
doubtful, at least as a general rule applying to all types of contracts.
The intention rule set forth in Teas seems to be dictum, since the parties
in that case did not express their intention that the law of a particular state
should govern. Instead, the place of making of the contract and the place of
performance were different, and the court was attempting to determine
which law should control in the absence of an expression of intention. The
court determined that the law of the place of performance should govern,
not because it was the law intended by the parties, but because "the focus
of the contract was so centered in Texas that its validity should be determined
by the laws of contract of that state."9 This sounds like the most significant
contacts theory of conflict of laws, a theory which has not yet been adopted
by the Texas courts despite the wording of the Fifth Circuit in Teas.'" In
instances where the intention is not expressed, the Texas courts seem to follow
Justice Story's old rule that when place of making and place of performance
are different, the law of the place of performance controls because the parties
presumably so intended." This rule would seem to have no application to the
question of whether an expressed intention will be given effect in a case in
which the validity of the contract is in issue.
In usury cases, however, the rules of conflict of laws have been modified so
that the intention of the parties is effectuated. It has been held that usurious
contracts are governed by the law of either the place of making or the place
of performance, or even more broadly, by the law of any state having a sub-
stantial bona fide relationship to the contract." In an old Texas case involving
a usurious contract, the court held that a citizen of one state who contracts
with a citizen of another may establish the interest rate according to either
state's law." Such a rule would, of course, allow the parties to choose the law
of a state having a reasonable relationship to the parties and the transaction,
and avoid the charge of usury. Moreover, in the absence of an expression of
intention, the law of any place having a substantial bona fide relationship
would apply. The court relied on this special usury conflict of laws rule in
Securities Investment.
Torts. In Click v. Thuron Industries" the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed
9 257 F.2d at 824.
10 The Supreme Court of Texas refused to adopt the significant contacts theory in the
case of Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). This was not
a contracts case but a wrongful death case. For discussion of the case, see Thomas, Conflict
of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 159, 159-62 (1969).
1J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 280 (2d ed. 1841). This really seems to be merely
a place of performance rule. A recent Texas Supreme Court case has held that the law of
the place of performance is the proper law to govern the validity of the contract. Castilleja
v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967).
12 The leading case is Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
See also Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Validity of Contracts-Texas Cases, 10 TEXAS L.
REV. 163, 167, 168, 184 (1931-1932).
IsDugan v. Lewis, 79 Tex. 246, 14 S.W. 1024 (1891). For a recent decision, see
Apodaca v. Banco Longoria, S.A., 451 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1970), error
ref. n.r.e.
14475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972).
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a decision of the Tyler court of civil appeals," and refused once again to adopt
the most significant contacts theory. Instead, the court relied on the lex loci
delictus doctrine, and thus refused to overrule Marmon v.. Mustang Aviation,
Inc.' The court was of the opinion that the Texas wrongful death statute
could not be given extraterritorial effect because the Texas Legislature had not
intended that it should be given effect outside of the state. Using the language
of Marmon, the court concluded: "[1Hience we do not have and will not have
a 'choice of laws' situation unless and until the Legislature gives extraterritorial
force to the statute."1
II. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
Westphal v. Palmer" removes a barrier which has existed in Texas to the
enforcement of interstate support under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA)." The case of Freeland v. Freeland,'4 which arose
in 1958 under the 1951 statute, had created an obstruction to the functioning
of the Support Act and the obtaining of support by the out-of-state obligee
under the Act. In that case a divorce, with custody of children to the mother
and support by the father, was awarded by a court in Tarrant County, Texas.
Thereafter, the mother and children established their residence in Indiana,
where she subsequently secured a judgment for child support which was
forwarded from Indiana to a court in Dallas County, Texas, for enforcement
under the URESA. The father had changed his residence to Dallas County.
It was held in Freeland that the court originally granting the support decree
retained exclusive jurisdiction over the support order. Therefore, another Texas
court could not modify, amend, or change the earlier orders. The court in
Westphal recognized that "[tihe Freeland case stands for the proposition that,
under the old act, the only proper Texas court to enforce a support order
issued ancillary to a Texas divorce was the court entering it originally. 1
The decision in Freeland has been criticized as inhibiting the full applica-
tion of URESA and as being violative of its purpose." Thus, it is good to see
the court in Westphal interpreting the new 1965 Texas Support Act" in
such a way as to nullify the Freeland doctrine. In Westphal the facts were
similar to those of Freeland, but the court held that the Freeland proposition
did not apply because of certain new provisions of the 1965 Act.
First, section 28 provides that support actions may be brought under the
15460 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970), error granted. For discussion, see
Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 191-93 (1972).
16430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). For discussion, see Thomas, supra note 10, at 159-62.
17475 S.W.2d at 716.
18480 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1972).
URESA was originally adopted in Texas in 1951 (ch. 377, [1951] Tex. Laws 643)
and provided a procedure whereby a person who is owed support may commence a proceed-
ing in an initiating state against the person who owes the duty of support and who is lo-
cated in another state. Copies of the petition and record are sent to the latter responding
state where personal service may be had upon the obligor and a valid personal judgment
can result. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 2328b-1 to -4 (1971).
20313 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958).
"1480 S.W.2d at 278.
"'Note, Conflict of Laws, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 814, 816 (1966).
" In 1965 the Texas Legislature repealed the earlier act and enacted TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-4 (1971). Ch. 679, S 39, [1965] Tex. Laws 1561, 1579.
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URESA even though there is already pending in another court a divorce pro-
ceeding which may involve the issue of support. Although the situation cov-
ered by section 28 differs somewhat from that of Freeland and W/estphal,
both situations involve the possibility of future action by another court in the
state. Second, section 29 states that no support order supersedes any other
order, and provides that amounts for a particular period paid pursuant to either
order are to be credited to amounts accruing or accrued for the same period
under both. This section pertains to parties located in different judicial dis-
tricts of the state and alleviates the dilemma of a defendant attempting to
comply with the orders of different Texas courts ordering him to make sup-
port payments. Finally, section 31 was noted, which provides for intrastate
application of the Support Act. Thus, the Act is now applicable not only to
situations in which the plaintiff and defendant are in different states, but also
when they are both in Texas but in different judicial districts. Since section
31 would permit Texas plaintiffs to obtain relief in a judicial district different
from that wherein the first support order was awarded, the court reasoned
that the legislature did not intend a different result for an out-of-state plaintiff
in the same situation. Such a state of affairs would result if the Freeland hold-
ing were to be applied. This would defeat the legislative intent "to give the
act the widest and most universal application possible."'"
III. JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
jurisdiction in Personam. In the case of Chapman v. Schefsky ' a California
resident had previously sued Texas defendants in a California court to rescind
written contracts for sales of securities because of fraud and to obtain return
of the purchase price. Jurisdiction in California over the nonresident defend-
ants was obtained under a section of the California Corporation Code which
requires those seeking to obtain a permit for the sale of securities in California
to make an irrevocable appointment of the California corporations commis-
sioner and his successor in office as the process agent.' The Texas defendants
had complied with this statute to the extent that they had irrevocably desig-
nated the commissioner as their process agent. Proper citation was served on
the commissioner and a copy of this, as well as of plaintiff's petition, was sent
and received by the Texas defendants. The defendants, however, failed to
appear and answer. Default judgment was then rendered against them by
the California court. The plaintiff sought to enforce this judgment in Texas
based on full faith and credit. Defendants resisted by attacking the validity of
the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of improper service
of process.2"
Defendants' first contention was weak indeed. It was alleged that the indi-
4480 S.W.2d at 280.
25470 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error ref. n.r.e.
26 CAL. CORP. CODE § 25240 (West 1955).
27 Jurisdiction over the person in the conflict of laws sense certainly existed in this case,
either by consent through compliance with the California statute or through the doing of
certain acts within the state. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
[Vol. 27
CONFLICT OF LAWS
vidual who occupied the office of commissioner at the time the defendants
designated the commissioner as agent no longer occupied that office at the
time of suit in California, and that, although the California statute spoke of
the commissioner "and his successor in office," in making the designation
the defendants designated the commissioner of corporations only, with no
mention of his successor. Therefore, service on the individual holding office
at the time of suit was ineffective and not in keeping with the actual desig-
nation. The court made short shrift of this argument by finding that as in-
tended by the laws of California, of which the court took judicial notice as re-
quested by the parties, the designation appointed the office of commissioner,
not the individual, as agent and that sufficient service had therefore been made.
Allegation was also made that the default judgment should be refused en-
forcement because of fraud which consisted of the failure of the plaintiff in
the California case to disclose the correct amounts of certain set-offs. The
Texas court did not agree, but found in accordance with the well-known
rule that only extrinsic fraud, i.e., fraud in the procurement of the judgment,
may be used to attack a sister state judgment.' Since the giving of false testi-
mony constituted intrinsic fraud, the judgment of the sister state could not
be challenged.
Confession of Judgment. According to the facts of Shaps v. Union Com-
merce Bank" the defendant, while residing in Ohio, executed a note payable
to the plaintiff which authorized any attorney at law to appear in any Ohio
court of record and confess judgment. Such a provision is valid in Ohio. The
defendant subsequently moved to Texas and, upon his failure and refusal to
pay the note, a default judgment was obtained by confession in Ohio. Defend-
ant had no actual notice of the suit nor was he served in Ohio. The trial court
and the appellate court held that this judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit in Texas despite the fact that a Texas statute prohibits a contractual
authorization for confessions of judgment.' The appellate court concluded
that a judgment obtained in a foreign state, where confessions of judgment
are recognized as valid, will be given full faith and credit in Texas.
This decision would seem to imply that in all cases where the confession
of judgment procedure is recognized in the foreign state Texas will accord
full faith and credit. It is submitted that such an implication is too broad.
In this case, where the contract was made and performable in Ohio, where the
most significant contacts also seem to be in Ohio, it can be said without much
trepidation that it is an Ohio contract to be governed by Ohio law. Since
confession of judgment had been authorized by the contract and the authoriza-
tion was valid according to the law governing the contract, jurisdiction in
personam existed in Ohio based on consent. 1 A valid judgment based upon
2
1R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82 (1968); Stumberg, supra note 12,
at 114-15. Extrinsic fraud is that fraud which goes to the opportunity to appear and to
defend. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 118b (1942).29476 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
50 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2224 (1971).
1 See G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 78-79 (3d ed. 1963) (con-
sent as a basis of jurisdiction in personam).
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valid jurisdiction had been rendered and was entitled to full faith and credit.
But, assume that this had been a Texas contract and that judgment was
confessed on this Texas contract in Ohio. Do we have a valid judgment which
is required to be enforced in Texas? Bernard Gloeckler Co. v. Baker Co.8
would say not. In that case, notes which authorized confession of judgment
were executed and made performable in Texas. Judgment was confessed in
Pennsylvania, where such procedure was valid. Nevertheless, the Texas court
refused full faith and credit on the ground that since the agreement was gov-
erned by Texas law (the court said validity, interpretation, and obligation of
contracts depend on the law of the state where the contract originates) which
made the confession of judgment void, the sister state did not have jurisdiction
over the defendant and, thus, had no power to give a valid judgment. Juris-
diction, if present, would have been based on consent of the parties to an exer-
cise of jurisdiction under the confession of judgment agreement. The con-
fession of judgment agreement, however, was void under the law governing
the contract. This lack of validity vitiated the consent and the lack of consent
vitiated the jurisdiction.
The court in Gloeckler did say that a different question would have been
presented had the note been made in Texas but performable in Pennsylvania,
and cited Hastings v. Bushong.3 The court did not elaborate on the point,
but it would seem that it must have had in mind the rule of at least some
Texas courts that if an agreement is made in one place, to be performed in
another, the law of place of performance governs validity." In such a case,
if the place of performance recognizes confession of judgment notes, the con-
sent and hence the jurisdiction to render a valid judgment both exist.
In Shaps the defendant also claimed fraud as a defense to the enforcement
of the judgment. The alleged fraud was said to exist in a scheme whereby the
Charles Corporation, which was defendant's employer at the time of the loan
which occasioned the note, was seeking to induce its employees to buy its
stock. The proceeds from the sales of Charles Corporation stock were to be
used to adjust its debt structure with the plaintiff. As in Chapman,' the court
held that only extrinsic fraud constituted a defense to the judgment, and the
fraud, if any, was intrinsic.
Adoption, Traditionally, jurisdiction for adoption is based on the domicile
of either the adopted child or the adoptive parent." However, it seems clear
that the personal rights of a natural parent cannot be extinguished in an
adoption proceeding unless the parent was personally subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state of adoption."7
3252 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1932).
' 252 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923), error dismissed.
34 Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967); see note 11 supra, and accom-
panying text.
" See notes 25-28 supra, and accompanying text.
"On the problem of jurisdiction and adoption, see Baade, Interstate and Foreign Adop-
tion in North Carolina, 40 N.C.L. REv. 691 (1962); Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of
Laws, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 222 (1954). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) S 78.
3' In Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held
that failure to give notice to a nonconsenting parent in the adoption proceeding denied
[Vol. 27
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In Rodgers v. Williamson the adoptive parents, one of whom was the
natural mother, were domiciled in Illinois where the adoption was granted.
The father, a domiciliary of Texas, had received due notice of the petition of
adoption, gone to Illinois, and employed an attorney to represent him in the
case. He then consented to the adoption. Under these facts, the adoption pro-
ceeding would normally be entitled to full faith and credit in a sister state."
Nevertheless, the natural father attacked the decree collaterally in a Texas
court, claiming fraud in the procurement on the ground that his consent to
the adoption was obtained through representations that he would retain visit-
ing rights with his child. Moreover, he sought to alter certain visitation rights
which had been previously agreed upon and incorporated into the Illinois de-
cree. The trial court, noting that no extrinsic fraud was shown, held that the
adoption decree was subject to full faith and credit. The judgment was affirmed
by the court of civil appeals.
Further, it was held that the visitation rights were created by an agreement
which was purely personal between the parties and were not imposed by re-
quirements of Illinois or Texas law. In an adoption the rights and duties of
the natural parents in relation to the child are extinguished, for they are re-
lieved of all parental responsibility.
It was also alleged by the natural father that the Texas court, which had
rendered the divorce to the natural parents and awarded custody to the natural
mother, had a continuing jurisdiction to modify the custody decree and thus
the jurisdiction to alter the visitation rights agreed upon and incorporated
into the Illinois adoption decree. The court responded that after an adoption
decree the jurisdiction of a divorce court granting custody and visitation rights
was terminated; and furthermore, according to Texas law, adoptive parents
could only be deprived of custody of the child by proof of their bad moral
character or by proof of abuse, neglect, or ill-treatment of the child. No such
proof had been submitted to the court.
Custody Decrees. Disputes over the extraterritorial effect of sister state cus-
tody decrees seem to arise with some frequency. No doubt these disputes are
caused in part by the state of confusion concerning the proper jurisdictional
basis for the grant of a custody award and the recognition which is to be
given to such an award in another state. The Supreme Court of the United
States has not laid down definite standards for the recognition of these decrees.
It is usually accepted, however, that they are subject to full faith and credit to
some extent,* at least as to the facts existing at the time the decree is granted,
but not as to changed conditions occurring after the grant of the decree."1
Even with respect to all matters up to the time of the rendition of the decree,
the court issuing the decree must have some jurisdictional basis.
due process of law. In May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), the Supreme Court held
that personal rights of a parent could not be extinguished in a custody proceeding unless
the parent was personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
8482 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 78; R. LEFLAR, supra note 28, § 242; G. STUMBERG,
supra note 31, at 338-40.4 0 R. LEFLAR, supra note 28, at 348; G. STUMBERG, supra note 31, at 322.
1 Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
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Three places are generally recognized as having jurisdiction for purposes
of awards of custody: the state of domicile of the child, the state where the
child is present, or the state where the parents are personally present." When
these bases of domicile or presence are found in one state, that state may exer-
cise jurisdiction. Difficulties arise, however, where there is division. This is
especially true when the award is granted in a place where the parents, or one
of them, is not personally subject to the jurisdiction of the courts which are
awarding custody, because the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that a parent cannot be deprived of his or her right to custody of a child by a
court not having jurisdiction over that parent.43
These principles were involved in the Texas cases of Franklin v. Wolfe
and Gunther v. Gunther.' In Franklin a divorce decree had been granted in
Texas and custody of the child had been awarded to the mother with provi-
sions for visitation by the father. No problem of jurisdiction was present
since the parties not only appeared to be domiciled in Texas but were per-
sonally present in the state. The mother married again and moved to Cali-
fornia, taking the child. Later, the father appeared before a California court
seeking a modification of his visitation rights. The California court confirmed
the Texas judgment but did modify the visitation rights. Thereafter, the father
took the child to Texas, refused to return the child to the mother at the end
of the visitation period, and filed suit in a Harris County, Texas, court seeking
the child's custody on the ground of changed conditions. Before the judgment
in this case, the mother filed a petition for habeas corpus in a Harris County
domestic relations court seeking discharge of the child from illegal confine-
ment and return of custody to her. Judgment was rendered in her favor.
Thereupon, the trial court dismissed the father's custody case for lack of
jurisdiction, which was said to result because a valid California decree was
res judicata of the issue. The father appealed from both decisions. The court
of civil appeals, treating both in one opinion, affirmed the judgment giving
custody to the mother on the ground that the California court's judgment as
to visitation was res judicata of the parent's rights as of the date of the judg-
ment. It was noted that changed conditions affecting the child's welfare might
call for a change of custody, but here there was no relevant change of condi-
tions.
Two side issues in this case are of some interest in the area of conflict of
laws. The court presumed that the California law of res judicata in relation
to a custody decree was the same as that of Texas. Such a presumption arises
in Texas, i.e., the presumption that applicable sister state law is the same as
that of Texas, in the absence of a request that the court take judicial notice of
the law of a sister state."
42 See, e.g., Justice Traynor's opinion in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197
P.2d 739, 741-51 (1948). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 5 79.
" May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The court held that full faith and credit was
not required where the mother was "neither domiciled, resident nor present" within the
state. Id. at 533.
"483 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1972).
"478 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1972), error ref. n.r.e.




The second issue concerned the father's custody suit that was filed in Texas
prior to the habeas corpus proceeding of the mother. When the mother came
to court to prosecute the habeas corpus proceeding, she was served with cita-
tion in the father's suit. The mother sought to invoke rule 120a, " which
permits a special appearance to challenge jurisdiction. The court was of the
opinion, following an earlier Texas case," that this rule only permitted a
challenge on the ground that the person or property was not subject to the
jurisdiction. Therefore, since the mother was present in the state, although
admittedly to participate in other litigation, rule 120a was not applicable.
Thus, Texas does not appear to be in accord with the accepted rule which
confers immunity from service of process upon nonresident parties who are
attending trial."
In Gunther the domestic relations court of Harris County also had before
it a habeas corpus action filed by a California mother seeking custody of her
children. In a previous divorce proceeding in California, the California court,
with jurisdiction over all parties, had granted custody to the father. Thereafter,
the mother became dissatisfied with the decree and sought and obtained a
change of custody before a California court. In this proceeding no service of
process was made and the father received no notice. Indeed, he had left Cali-
fornia with the children for Texas. The mother sought enforcement of this
decree in Texas. The trial court held that she was entitled to custody by virtue
of the California decree. The court of civil appeals found that the trial court
had erred. There was no evidence that the father had received citation or
notice, and actual or constructive jurisdiction over the father had not been
obtained. Holding in accord with the Supreme Court doctrine that parents'
rights to custody of children are personal, requiring personal service and juris-
diction,"° the court of civil appeals found the custody judgment against the
nonresident parent to be void. Moreover, the mother's suit for custody in Cali-
fornia on grounds of changed conditions was held to be a new and independent
act, not a necessary concomitant of the original custody award."
The court then noted that the California decree granting custody to the
father, which was based on jurisdiction over all parties, was entitled to full
faith and credit as a valid sister state judgment unless changed conditions
warranted change. The Texas court had jurisdiction to change custody upon
proof of a material change of conditions since the parents were before the court
and since jurisdiction to determine custody is not necessarily dependent upon
the domicile of the children in Texas, but upon their presence in the state.
Because of the father's deliberate secreting of the child from the mother for
a period of several months, changing of custody from father to mother was
4
1 TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a.
" Oates v. Blackburn, 430 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968),
error r'ef. n.,.e.
"OSee H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLIcT OF LAwS 116 (1964); G. STUMBERG,
supra note 31, at 71.
5 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
" In general, jurisdiction once obtained over a defendant continues as to all subsequent
matters in the same litigation, but not as to a different action not an essential concomitant
of the original suit. See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
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warranted on the ground that he had demonstrated himself to be an unfit
and improper person to be awarded custody.
Probate. The 1934 Restatement of the Conflict of Laws provides that "(a]
judgment in administration proceedings by a competent court in the state of
domicile will be followed by the courts in other states insofar as the judgment
relates to movables."" Since the validity of a testator's disposition of movables
is determined by the law of his domicile at death, it would follow that a will
admitted to probate there should be conclusively recognized as valid in all
other states because the domiciliary state had jurisdiction." Nevertheless, the
full faith and credit clause does not seem to have been construed to demand
such recognition, 4 although a probate at the domicile must be accorded full
faith and credit as to assets in that state."
It should be stressed that the domiciliary rule normally applies only to pro-
bate of movables. The weight of authority does not render a probate decree
conclusive as to the validity of a will disposing of real property located in
a state other than where the decree is granted." The Texas rule, however, does
not seem to be in accord with the weight of authority. Bourland v.. Hanes"'
involved the enforcement of an Alabama probate decree in Texas. The will
in question disposed of real property in Texas and personal property in Ala-
bama. Making no distinction between real or personal property, the Texas
court, following and citing earlier Texas cases," concluded that jurisdiction to
probate a will is possessed exclusively by the courts of the state of the dece-
dent's domicile at death, and further, that full faith and credit must be ac-
corded to the probate at the domicile when questions of the instrument's
authenticity are involved.
This holding might be correct with respect to movables and certainly would
be correct with respect to movables located in Alabama. But, as noted pre-
viously, the weight of authority would not require full faith and credit for a
probate of a will disposing of land in another jurisdiction. In any event, the
Alabama probate decree was refused enforcement in Bourland because the
jury had found that the decedent was not domiciled in Alabama at her death."
The court of civil appeals refused to disturb this jury finding inasmuch as it
was based on ample evidence.
"RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 470(1) (1934).
-11Id. § 470(1), comment; see Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind.
682, 48 N.E. 592 (1897); Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52 S.W. 296 (1899); Jones v.
Jones, 301 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957), error ref. n.r.e.
4 H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 49, at 341.
"Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907).
1' Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1023, 1026, 1033 (1941). See also Hopkins, The Extraterritorial
Effect of Probate Decrees, 53 YALE L.J. 221, 229-36, 249-54 (1944). Such a decree is
not recognized because the courts of one state have no jurisdiction to pass upon the title to
real property having a situs in another state.
57474 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971).
5 See Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S.W.2d 726 (1931); DeTray v. Hardgrove,
52 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932), judgment adopted, and others cited in 474
S.W.2d at 598.
"A finding that decedent was domiciled in one state does not preclude subsequent liti-
gation on this jurisdictional fact by persons who were not parties to the earlier proceeding.




Jurisdiction over Foreign Executrix. At common law the rule emerged that
an administrator or executor could neither sue nor be sued in his official capa-
city outside the state of his appointment." This traditional rule has in general
been the rule in Texas, where it has been recognized that a foreign represen-
tative is an officer of the court appointing him, derives his authority from that
court, and is, therefore, empowered to administer the assets only within the
jurisdiction of the appointing court. A representative of an estate thus has no
extraterritorial jurisdiction.6'
The modern trend in many jurisdictions has been away from this narrow
viewpoint; this has been especially true with respect to suits brought under
non-resident motorist statutes. The validity of such statutes, which permit an
action to be brought in the state where the automobile accident occurred
against the foreign representative of a deceased nonresident motorist, has been
upheld by the courts of many states." An exercise of jurisdiction over the
foreign representatives in cases in which his decedent could have been sued
can be justified since it permits litigation at a forum convenient to the wit-
nesses and the plaintiff without placing an unreasonable burden on the defend-
ant representative or on the decedent's estate. Thus, it is good to find the Texas
rule so extended in the case of Cox v. Crow.63
In this case suit was brought in a federal district court in Texas by a widow
for the wrongful death of her husband in a collision which occurred in Texas.
The defendant was the widow and executrix of the estate of the driver of the
other car involved. Both the defendant executrix and her late husband were
residents of Nebraska. She was appointed executrix by a Nebraska court and
claimed that the court in Texas had no jurisdiction over her because she
possessed no authority to sue or be sued in Texas. The court, applying Texas
law, concluded otherwise. It cited several Texas statutes to uphold the result."'
The court primarily relied, however, upon the non-resident motorist long-arm
statute, article 2039a," which designates the chairman of the state highway
commission as agent for a nonresident driver for service of process in any
suit against the driver growing out of an accident or collision on a Texas
highway. The statute also provides that the chairman is agent for the legal
representative of the driver's estate.
Looking to precedents in other states upholding an exercise of jurisdiction
over the foreign representative, the court stated that "[many of the Circuit
60 See H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 49, at 366; Cheatham, The Statutory Suc-
cessor, the Receiver and the Executor in Conflict of Laws, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 549 (1944).
"1 Faulkner v. Reed, 241 S.W. 1002 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922), holding approved;
Lindahl v. Thacker, 26 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930); Clark v. Web-
ster, 94 S.W. 1088 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
62See, e.g., Parrott v. Whisler, 313 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1963); Brooks v. National Bank,
251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958). For a collection of other cases upholding the validity, see H.
GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 49, at 127 n.186.
'3336 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
64 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4671 (1952), which provides for wrongful death
actions; id. art. 4676, which permits suit against the executor if the defendant dies before
institution of suit; id. art. 5525 (1958), which permits the cause of action to survive after
the death of the person against whom it should have accrued.
6
5 1d. art. 2039a (1964).
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Courts in this country have held specifically . . . that a non-resident adminis-
trator or executor may be sued as a defendant in the courts of the state where
the accident occurred and in which the decedent would have been a defendant
had he survived the accident."" The court went on to say that it believed the
Texas rule to be the same, particularly in view of article 2039a which demon-
strated a legislative intention that Texas courts have jurisdiction over cases
involving torts committed on the state's highways.
The case was distinguished from the traditional rule which would not allow
suit against a foreign representative in another jurisdiction, because cases in
which that rule had been applied were concerned for the most part with the
protection and administration of assets having a Texas situs. Moreover, it
was asserted that such a rule, which was announced before the enactment of
article 2039a, could not be controlling authority in a case involving a tort
arising from the use of highways by a nonresident motorist.
Procedures Under the Long-Arm Statute. The Texas long-arm statute was
involved in Parnass v. L & L Realty Corp.7 The following three questions
were before the court: "Whether the petition alleges the jurisdictional facts
necessary for substituted service under this statute, whether such jurisdictional
allegations must be supported by proof, and whether the record must show
that the Secretary of State mailed the process to defendant.""
At the time of the filing of the action the defendant was a Colorado resident,
but at the time the cause of action arose the defendant was a Texas resident.
Moreover, the cause of action arose out of business in which the defendant
had been engaged in Texas. These facts were alleged in the plaintiff's petition.
It was further alleged that defendant had not appointed an agent in Texas
for service of process and that there was no person in Texas in charge of any
business of the defendant upon whom service of process could have been made.
Thus, service of process was made upon the secretary of state of Texas in
accordance with section 6 of article 2031b."9 Default judgment was rendered
against the defendant, who sought reversal on writ of error, claiming that the
plaintiff's petition was insufficient to authorize service on the secretary of
state. Insufficiency resulted because the petition failed to allege that defendant
did not maintain a place of regular business in Texas. Looking to the language
of section 6, the court held that there was no requirement of an allegation
that the party did not maintain a place of regular business in the state. To
the contrary, section 6 provides for service on the secretary of state only when
one becomes a nonresident after the cause of action arises and when one is
not required to appoint a service of process agent in Texas. The court then
stated that the plaintiff's petition need not allege that defendant was not re-
quired to appoint an agent in the state if it alleges as it did "that defendant
" 336 F. Supp. at 763.
67482 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972).
'lid. at 945.
69TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 6 (1964), provides that when a person
becomes a non-resident after a cause of action arises in Texas but before suit has been
brought upon it in a Texas court and when such defendant is not required to appoint
a service agent in Texas, service of process may be had upon the secretary of state.
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'has not appointed an agent in this state upon whom service may be made.' "T
Relying on section 1 of article 2031b, which creates a conclusive pre-
sumption that the person has designated the secretary of state as service agent
in those instances where the person is required to appoint an agent and does
not, the court reasoned: "If such a defendant [as here] is not required to
appoint an agent, section 6 applies, and if he is required to appoint an agent
but has not done so, process may be served on the Secretary of State under
Section 1, which expressly so provides, so that in either event service on the
Secretary of State is authorized.""'
The contention was also made by the defendant that the plaintiff could not
resort to section 6 if section 2 were available. Section 2 permits suit against
a nonresident through service upon a person who at the time of suit is in
charge of any business of the defendant's in the state. This argument was
not heeded. First, the court asserted that the petition showed the non-
availability of section 2 by stating that there was no person in the state
charged with any business in which the defendant was engaged and upon
whom service might have been had. Second, the court pointed out that sec-
tion 2 was not applicable in any event, for it applies to suits against nonresi-
dents arising out of business done in Texas, while section 6 applies to a cause
of action arising while the defendant is still a resident of Texas but who later
becomes a nonresident.
The court also rejected the defendant's argument that the judgment must be
reversed because the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations were not supported
by proof. The court found that proof of jurisdictional prerequisites was not
required when such prerequisites were set forth in the petition. In effect, the
plaintiff's allegation of jurisdiction was considered to be admitted and estab-
lished when the defendant failed to appear to contest the jurisdiction.
The defendant's concluding argument that the default judgment should be
reversed because the record did not show that the secretary of state forwarded
a copy of the citation to the nonresident defendant was also rejected. The
court noted that strict compliance with the statutory method of service of
process was required, but that this was satisfied by the allegation in the peti-
tion which set forth the statutory requirements for substituted service and the
return reciting service on the secretary of state. Service was considered com-
plete when it was made on the state official, and violation of the statutory duty
by the official to mail the citation to the defendant would not oust the court
from jurisdiction."2
Minimum Contacts. As usual, the Texas courts were faced with several cases
involving the vague minimum contacts jurisdictional rule which was pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington.' In that case the Court considered the constitutionality of an
exercise of judicial jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation and held that
70482 S.W.2d at 946.
71 Id.
7' For a discussion of when service is complete under a statute which provides for con-
structive service on a nonresident motorist, see Annot., 82 A.L.R. 768, 773 (1933).
73326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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"due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ""
The Texas long-arm statute, article 203 1b, is based on this decision. Article
203 lb permits suit against out-of-staters upon causes of action arising out of
the doing of business within the state through service of process upon the
secretary of state, who is directed to send a copy of the process to the non-
resident defendant by registered mail. Doing of business for the purpose of
the act includes "entering into a contract by mail or otherwise with a resident
of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State, or
the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State.""5
In interpreting the constitutional requirements for exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident under a long-arm statute, the Supreme Court of Texas
stated in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do
some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause
of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . ..
National Truckers Service, Inc. v. Aero Systems, Inc.," Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Tice," and Customs Textiles, Inc. v. Crown Sample Book"
each involved the doing of business in Texas by out-of-state defendants which
consisted of contracts with Texas residents to be performed wholly or in part
within the state.
In National Truckers the contract was accepted by the Texas resident in
Texas; it was made performable in Texas by its own terms; and the cause of
action arose out of defendant's default on the contract. It was then reasoned
that since the first two factors required by O'Brien were fulfilled, the third
would automatically be met because traditional notions of fair play would be
satisfied. Thus, the three basic constitutional requirements for an exercise of
jurisdiction over the nonresident were present.
A final point of interest in this case concerns the plaintiff, National Truck-
ers Service (NTS). Was NTS, a Maryland corporation which had its corporate
office and principal place of business in Texas, a resident of Texas for pur-
poses of article 2031b, which defines doing of business in Texas as the making
of a contract with a Texas resident to be performed in whole or in part in
the state? The general rule, of course, is that a corporation is considered a
citizen of the state in which it is incorporated, such place also being considered
its domicile."
41d. at 316.
75TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
70399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966). This statement was quoted from Tyee Constr.
Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P. 245, 251 (1963).
77480 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972).
7"331 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
79472 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971).




This was the first case to require the construction of the term "resident"
for purposes of article 2031b. The court relied on the general rule that a
foreign corporation is not only a resident of the state of incorporation but
also of the place where it conducts business, particularly the place of its
principal business. The court concluded that such a decision was necessary in
order to comply with the constitutional requirements of equal protection,
since it would deny equal protection of the laws to permit suit against a
corporation doing business in Texas and at the same time deny such a corpora-
tion the right to bring suit in Texas.
In both Clark Advertising and Custom Textiles the courts found that there
were sufficient contacts to meet the minimum contacts rule and that the re-
quirements of article 2031b were met. In Clark Advertising the defendant
had entered into a contract with the Texas plaintiff to furnish advertising and
promotional services to the defendant for automobile races in Arizona.
Although the defendant claimed that no part of the contract was to be per-
formed in Texas, the court thought otherwise and stated that since the con-
tract was made with a Texas resident having offices in Texas, the defendant
could reasonably infer that part of the contract would be performed in Texas.
On the question of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, it
was pointed out that the defendants had conducted and supervised auto races
in Texas on many occasions and that they had had the benefit and protection
of Texas laws. Under these circumstances, to subject a defendant to suit in
Texas in an instance where the defendant had made a contract with a Texas
resident to be performed in part in Texas, would not offend notions of fairness.
Although the out-of-state defendant claimed that the suit in Custom Tex-
tiles was the result of a single isolated transaction in Texas and thus outside
the pale of minimum contacts and article 2031b, the court disagreed. The
facts demonstrated that the defendant had come to Texas to discuss the manu-
facturing of certain sample books for the Texas plaintiff. A contract was
finally negotiated by telephone conversation authorizing the manufacture.
Sample books were sent to Texas and monies were paid to defendant from
Texas. These contacts were held to be sufficient.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in
Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp.,81 considered the interesting problem
of whether jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over the parent. The 1925 Supreme Court case, Cannon Manu-
facturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.," fully maintained the corporate fiction
and held that jurisdiction over the subsidiary did not confer jurisdiction over
the parent. The modern rule, however, has to some extent broken away from
this concept. In instances in which a foreign company, through its subsidiary,
carries on activities in a state which give rise to a cause of action in that
state, jurisdiction over the foreign parent may be exercised by that state under
a long-arm statute.8"
81338 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
82267 U.S. 333 (1925).
" The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 52 permits an exercise of jurisdiction by a state
over a foreign corporation in situations where the corporation has a relationship to the
state which makes an exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. As to jurisdiction over a foreign
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The district court in Bland followed the more modern view and held the
foreign parent subject to the jurisdiction of Texas. Bland, a Texas seller of a
motel, brought an action in Texas against Colonel Sanders Inn, Inc. (CSI)
and Kentucky Fried Chicken Corporation (KFC), which owned ninety-five
percent of the stock of CSI. Bland made a contract with the subsidiary CSI for
the sale of the motel in exchange for shares of common stock in KFC which
CSI would cause to be issued. This contract was made and to be performed
in Texas. No question of judicial jurisdiction in Texas over CSI, the subsidiary,
existed. The question before the court was whether jurisdiction existed over
KFC under article 2031b and the minimum contacts rule. KFC did a great
amount of business in Texas in the form of the granting of its franchise to
Texas outlets. However, the cause of action did not arise out of the franchises,
but out of a completely unrelated matter, i.e., the sale and purchase of the
motel. The franchising contacts would have been sufficient to meet the con-
stitutional requirement of minimum contacts and fair play established in
International Shoe, the court stated, even where the cause of action in the
state did not arise out of those contacts. But since the Texas courts had limited
the Texas long-arm statute to suits arising out of business done in Texas, the
federal court declined to stretch the Texas statute to the limits of the mini-
mum contacts rule.
Thus, jurisdiction, if it were to attach against KFC, would have to attach
because KFC was, through its subsidiary CSI, a party to the contract. The
court declared that through ownership of ninety-five percent of CSI stock,
KFC controlled CSI's business decisions. Moreover, it was pointed out that
the contract with the subsidiary was permeated with references to the parent's
financial condition; that the contract's consideration was in the form of the
parent's stock; and that KFC was to undertake the registration statement
which would cover at least fifty percent of the stock issued to the plaintiff.
These facts, the court believed, indicated that KFC through its subsidiary had
entered into a contract in Texas which was by its own terms to be performed
in Texas, and thus there was a doing of business in Texas sufficient under
article 2031b for an exercise of jurisdiction. The provisions of the Restate-
ment (Second) seem to be adopted, since the facts indicate that the subsidiary
acted at the direction of the parent in making the contract and, furthermore,
that the subsidiary was under the domination and control of the parent."
The final long-arm statute case for review here is that of Hayes v. Caltex
Petroleum Corp.,' in which a federal district court failed to find sufficient mini-
mum contacts for an exercise of jurisdiction in Texas. The plaintiff, an Okla-
homa resident, sued defendant in Texas for unpaid salary, damages for breach
of an employment contract, and exemplary damages. The defendant was a
Delaware corporation which maintained no office in Texas. Its sole contacts
parent corporation, it is stated that if the subsidiary does an act in the state at the direction
of the parent the state has jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation. Moreover, juris-
diction over the subsidiary will establish jurisdiction over the foreign parent if the foreign
parent controls and dominates the subsidiary such that it disregards the subsidiary's inde-
pendent status.
84 See note 83 supra.
1332 F. Supp. 1205 (1971).
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with Texas consisted of the maintenance of an employee in Houston to in-
terpret certain physical data and the purchase of lubes from Texas suppliers
for shipment abroad F.O.B. Texas ports. Shipment of these lubes was arranged
by an independent freight forwarder.
The court, quoting the three basic elements for an exercise of judicial juris-
diction under the Texas long-arm statutes set forth in O'Brien, found that the
second element was missing in this case, i.e., the plaintiff's cause of action
did not arise in Texas, for it was not connected with any of the defendant's
activities in Texas.
In National Truckers it was said that the Texas long-arm statute permits
an exercise of jurisdiction to the fullest permissible reach under the federal
constitutional minimum contacts rule. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian was cited
for the proposition that "the Texas purpose . . .was to exploit to the maxi-
mum the fullest permissible reach under federal constitutional restraints." "
The Texas rule of O'Brien, however, seems to accept article 2031b and does
not reach to the fullest possible limits of International Shoe. Thus, the court
in Bland was of the opinion that article 2031b had not been interpreted to
make a nonresident subject to the jurisdiction in an instance where the cause
of action did not arise within the state." The O'Brien rule requires that the
cause of action arise or be connected with an act or transaction in Texas. Cases
in other jurisdictions have held that the minimum contacts rule is satisfied
and jurisdiction in a state can be exercised over causes of action which do not
arise out of business done in that state, if the business that is done is of such
a continuous and substantial nature as to make an exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable."
An exercise of jurisdiction has been held to be reasonable when the de-
fendant's principal place of business happened to be within the state. In Hayes
the defendant's principal place of business was not Texas, the plaintiff was not
a resident of Texas, and the cause of action was completely unrelated to de-
fendant's activities in Texas. Moreover, the defendant's activities were perhaps
too slight to make the defendant subject to suit even under the constitutional
rule. The slighter the plaintiff's connection with the state, the greater must
be the defendant's connection when the cause of action does not arise out of
business done within the state." The contacts of the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the cause of action with Texas were too tenuous to justify jurisdiction in
Texas in Hayes.
16414 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cit. 1969); see Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 25 SW. L.J. 146 (1971).
7 See notes 81-85 supra, and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Bryant v.
Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208 N.E.2d 439 (1965).
"
9See Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1970). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 42, 47.
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